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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Case No. 18134 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
VS. 
BRENT BINDRUP, .. -· .. ,); . . ~ ..... 
Defendant/ Appellant. ,, 
~;;. .·. ~? \ 
' i- ; ."'.-=.-
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE or THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from· a conviction of murder in the 2nd 
degree in the Second Judic:~al District Court, Weber County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding. 
" DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of murder in the 2nd degree in a 
non-jury trial held before the Honorable Calvin Gould, on 
. . .. ~ .. :': 
: .. ·~ ··. 
September 21, 1981. Appellant was sentenced to a term of five 
' ·• 
years to life in the Utah1State Prison. The sentence was 
suspended and~the appellartt~was placed on probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 8, 1980, at approximately 1:50 a.m., appellant 
was travelling southbound on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, 
when he went through a red light at the intersection of 31st 
Street and Washington Boulevard, and collided with a motorcycle 
driven by the victim. The victim was travelling east on 31st 
Street and had lawfully e~te~ed the intersection on a green light. 
The motorcyclist was killed and, although appellant's truck went 
into a spin and overturned, the truck's occupants were not 
seriously injured. The appellant had been drinking and the 
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-I, 
I I 
evidence at trial indicated a blood alcohol level of .12%, r: 
i 1 
I; 
approximately one hour after the accident. There was also , 1 
f. I: 
evidence that appellant had, prior to the accident, run through 
i I I: 
at least two other red lights on Washington Boulevard, and was 
I 
~ravelling in excess of the 35 mph posted speed limit. Var~ous 
witnesses estimated the speed of the appellant's vehicle at 
~ 
between 40 mph and 59 mph. 
I; 
I 
t' 
t l At the first preliminary hearing held on October 23, 1980, 
before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Judge of the Ogden Circuit 
t; 
Court, the prosecution attempted to get a bind over on a 2nd 
t I 
I' 
q~gree murder charge. However, Judge Taylor felt that thisdwas 
: I 
~~t· the type of situation the legislature meant to encompass 
w~thin the murder statute. Judge Taylor did find probable cause 
I 
. that the crime of manslaughter had been committed and bound the 
case over to the Second Judicial District Court on that charge. 
I 1 
I 
The prosecution dismissed the charge of manslaughter and went 
back to the Ogden Circuit Court on the charge of 2nd degree murder. 
, 
A, preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable E. F. Ziegler 
r i 
r: 
on July 10, 1981, and, again the defense argued that the 2nd degree 
'1 
murder statute did not apply to the facts of this case. However, 
I, 
Judge Ziegler found probable cause that the crime had been 
I 
cbnnnitted and the appellant was bound over on the charge of. 2nd 
degree murder. 
The trial was held on September 3, 1981, before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould, Judge of the Second Judicial District Court, Weber 
Gpunty, Utah, sitting without a jury. After hearing the evidence, 
t•···.~ 
Jpdge Gould took the matter under advisement and rendered 
11 
'' 
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memorandum decision on September 21, 1981, finding the appellant 
guilty of 2nd degree murder'. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT'S CONDUCT 
EVIDENCED THE ,~-PEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE FOR 
HUMAN LIFE" REQUIRED BY UTAH'S SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER STATUTE. · 
Appellant was convicted of a 1st degree felony based upon a 
violation of UCA Section 76~5-203(l)(c). Specifically, this 
section states: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
<a) . . . ~;:_.. (b) . . . . ,. 
A~ting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he 
recklessly engaged in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another. 
It is a universally held view in our criminal justice system, 
that a conviction of murder requires a showing of malice on the 
part of the accused. In the~case of Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d, 
... , . 
1107 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that Utah 
adheres to this fundamental principle. The court states in that 
case that: 
For many years the definition of second 
degree murder ·has been the.· unlawful killing 
of a human be~ng with mali~e aforethought, 
and that of manslaughter was the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice. 
In our opinion, the new criminal code has 
not changed those definitions. Id at 1109. 
See also State v. ·Lingman, 91 P.2d 457 (Utah 1939); State v. 
Barker, 196 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948.) 
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~J The issue of what is meant by implied malice was squarely 
c~nfronted by the Supreme Court of· Arizona in the case of State 
v,1 Chalmers, 411 P. 2d 448 (Arizona 1966.) In that case, the 
defendant was travelling on a two lane highway at between 80 mph 
J .. 
and 100 mph, and passed several cars going in the same direction. 
! 
Iln doing so, the defendant forced two vehicles, coming the opposite 
d~rection, to completely leave the highway to avoid a collision. 
Defendant swerved back into his own lane and then, shortly · 
thereafter, attempted to pass more vehicles when he collided' 
h~ad-on into two vehicles in the opposite lane, causing two1 1 
fatalities and three serious injuries. Defendant was convicted 
of 2nd degree murder and appealed. The court admitted that: 
tl 
'l 
t • 
There is sufficient evidence for the jury to find gross negligence and 
utter disregard of the safety or 
welfare of any person who might have 
been in the vicinity of defendant's 
car; 
'I 
but held that due to the lack of showing of malice, or as they 
called it: 
i' 11 An abandoned or malignant heart, the 
defendant was not guilty of murder. 
At 452. 
In the case of Blackwell v. Maryland, 369 A.2d 53 (Md. 1977), 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland explored the same issue. 
In that case, a teenage girl riding a bicycle with lights and 
reflectors, was killed by an intoxicated driver who was weaving 
on and off the road. The defendant made no attempt to stop, 
either before or after hitting the girl. The trial judge gave 
~ ' 
a lengthy discussion of the malice, implied or actual, required 
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for a conviction of murder and discussed the gross negligence, 
wanton and reckless conduct that fs required for a finding of 
manslaughter. In overturning the conviction, the appeals 
court ruled that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in 
presenting the issue of murder to the jury becau~1e of clear lack 
of malice. 
The appellant, in the p~~sent case, was convicted of 2nd 
degree murder by the Honorable Calvin Gould. The only case that 
,) 
Judge Gould refers to in his.~_memorandum decision is the Utah 
~upreme Court case of State··y. Nicholson, 585 P.1d 60 (1978 Utah.) 
;.;.~ ·_ 
In .. the Nicholson case the cburt explains the term "depraved 
" 
.indifference" by listing five .. cases which represent examples of 
that type of conduct. Four ··of these cases are, People v. Burden, 
.. 
140 Ca. Rptr. 282 (1977), starvation of a five month old child; 
Gibson v. State, 476 P.2d 362 (Okl. Cir. 1979), prisoner grabbing 
a steering wheel of sheriff's car while in transit; State v. 
Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487 (Idaho 1974), killing a policeman with a 
bomb; and State v. Draves, 524 P.2d 1225 (Ore. 1974), reckless 
shooting of a gun into a crowd. Each of these cases clearly conform 
\ 
I· 
to the concept of implied malice. The fifth case of Wagner v. State, 
250 NW 2d 331 (1977 Wis.) is the only case where the facts bear 
any resemblance to the case presently before the court. This 
; 
Wisconsin Supreme Court case is mis-cited in the Nicholson case 
and, therefore, the holding.is incorrectly used in Judge Gould's 
memorandum decision. 
In the Wagner case, the Wisconsin Court renders an excellent 
discussion on what is meant by a depraved mind. In that case, the 
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\: 
d~f endant had ingested pain medication and enough alcohol te have 
I 
a 1 1 .178% blood alcohol two hours after the incident. The def,endant 
wps driving a high powered automobile and was waiting at a red 
light when another car stopped and a challenge to race was 
accepted. The two vehicles proceeded to race doWI1 the town~s 
main street and the defendant's vehicle struck and killed a· 
pedestrian. The vehicles did not stop, but continued -racing: 
' 
down Central Avenue. The defendant's car was seen speeding across 
railraod tracks at approximately 50 mph, causing sparks to fly. 
A1!witness led the police to the defendant's car. In overturning 
the appellant's murder conviction the court observes that: 
; \ ; 
! • 
i 1. ~ 
t: 
To constitute a depraved mind, more 
than· a high degree of negligence or 
recklessness must exist. The mind 
must not only disregard the safety 
of another, but be devoid of regard 
for the life of another. A depraved 
mind lacks the moral sense and 
appreciation of life, and is 
unreasonable ·and lacks judgment. A 
depraved mind has the general intent 
to do the acts and the consciousness 
of the nature of the acts and possible 
result but lacks the specific intent 
to do the harm. Id at 340. 
In other words, the court is saying that the legislature did 
not put the word "depraved" in the statute as mere surplusage. 
The state must show that the defendant was aware or should have 
been aware that his conduct was innninently dangerous to human life, I 
It is not necessary to show that a defendant intended to kill any 
specific individual. However, it is not enough to show that the 
defendant's conduct could conceivably result in someone's death. 
The distinction is important because it rightfully reserves ;the 
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L 
murder statute for those cases where malice or a clear substitute 
I 
for malice is present. For example, if parents fail to feed an 
infant, they may, not consciously intend that the infant should 
die, but it is reasonable for the law to place the burden on the 
parents that they should have known... If a person drives a car 
or shoots a gun into a crow~ of people without intending to kill 
' ' 
anyone, it is also reasonable for the law to assume that a normal 
.. 
,, 
moral person would realize. that, regardless of intent, someone 
will probably die. These are cases wh.ere a "depraved indifference" 
on the part of the actor e~ists and the law will imply malice . 
. '' 
The Wisconsin Court in Wagner, supra, recognized that the 
defendant's conduct created a situation of unreasonable risk of 
injury. However, the court ruled that the fact situation was 
1 
., . 
insufficient to show that defendant's conduct constituted a 
. ·, l 
' -depraved mind. The court also found that the defendant lacked 
the state of mind necessary for him to be found guilty of 2nd 
degree murder. 
In the present case, the appellant was driving while intoxicated 
at a speed of. somewhat over the limit·.· The streets were virtually 
deserted at 2~00 a.m., and the defend&nt foolishly and negligently 
drove through several intersections with red lights. Anytime 
someone runs through a red_light there is the danger of an accident. 
But, the facts are that the vast majority of times that someone 
passes through a red light_, there is no resulting incident. On 
this particular occasion, the appellant's truck and the victim's 
motorcycle arrived at the same point at the same time and a 
terrible tragedy occurred. The appellant did not intend for the 
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1 l 
., 
I 
event to occur. 
l,; 
No one can claim that the appellant, even 
unconsciously, intended to kill the victim in this case as 
I 
" 
• J 
I, 
d 
·i. 
required by the concept of malice. 
t 
The court in the Wagner .• 
tJ 
~ J 
t\ 
srpra, case referred to an earlier Wisconsin case of Seidler v. 
t 1 
': 
State, 219 N·. W. 2d 320. (1974), and stated that: 
;( 
It was not the lack of evidence of any 
intent to harm' the deceased in Seidler, 
~. which this court found critical, 
~ather the lack of intent to do the 
act which resulted in the death, i.e., 
a lack of evidence· that Seidler 
consciously threw the victim at the hard 
and unyielding portions of the bed. 
Id at 341. 
d 
i 
Likewise, in the case before this court, no one has ar§ued 
that the appellant intended to run his vehicle into another~. 
l. 
v~hicle under circumstances where he should have known thattsomeone 
~9uld be killed or injured as would be required to show implied 
, 
~~li~e. ~ 
; ~ The state could only introduce evidence that the defendant 
may have intended to run the red light. Even this evidence was 
controverted by the testimony of the psychiatrist. From this 
showing, the prosecution tried to imply that the appellant should 
~: 
have known that he would collide with another car and, further, 
that this inevitable collision would cause the death of another. 
·' 
By accepting the prosecution's argument, the trial court has 
~ 
attempted to stretch and contort the parameters of the murder 
statute to include what was, under the circumstances, an automobile 
accident. The appellant was not acting under circumstances where 
a person should have known the event would occur~ The appellant 
d:id not de;'~nstrate a depraved indifference to the li;;~ of the . 
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victim. In fact, the evidence at trial tended to show that he 
was badly shaken by the results of his actions. 
It was the clear lack of malice in the present case which 
caused Judge Stanton Taylor, in the first preliminary hearing, 
to refuse to bind over the case on a murder charge. Judge Taylor 
stated that: 
•\ 
The court does.riot believi that it was 
the intent of the legislature to cover 
this type of incident with your second 
d¢gree murder statute. !~believe that 
in order to be. cbnvicted of a second d~gree murder urid~r these circumstances, 
the defendant would have to be aware of 
the presence of~·,::either the victim or 
someone like him. In other words, 
some specific knowledge that a person 
is being endangered by my conduct, not 
a generalized ~nowledge that someone 
might be ther~, ,. ~ome potential hazard, 
but a specific knowledge that a person 
is there and I;am creating a danger to 
him through my willful indifference to 
his safety. 
First preliminary hearing transcript, 
page ss. 
Although Judge Taylor'~ remarks are, in no way, binding upon 
this court, appellant contends that the judge has correctly 
expressed the state of the. law in Utah. That the terms "depraved 
,; 
indifference to human life" and "grave risk of d~ath" require a 
showing that the appellant was aware of a person•s presence and 
aware that his conduct would probably result in a person's death 
or near death, and that the appellant continued in his course of 
conduct ~ith no concern fot the consequences. The facts in the 
present case showed that the appellant ran through a red light 
... 
. in' the middle of the night when the streets were virtually ·deserted. 
The appellant was not acting under some depraved death wish 
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and, clearly, ·had no intention of hurting himself or anyone 
else. The evidence at trial showed that the appellant was 
d~eply distressed and concerned for the victim of the accident 
and showed great remorse for the results of his foolish behavior. 
Had the appellant had any real belief that his actions would 
result in another's death, he would not have run the red light. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, CONSTITUTED AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 
AS SET OUT IN THE UTAH CODE. 
The Utah Automobile Homicide Statute, UCA 76-5-207, at· ·the 
t'i.me of this offense, read ~as follows: 
•, 
,, . 
II ; I J 
' 
Criminal Homicide constitutes automobile 
homicide if the actor, while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, a 
controlled substance, or any drug, to 
a degree which renders the actor 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, 
causes the death of another by operating 
a motor vehicle in a negligent manner. 
The above statute was interpreted by this court in its 
decision of State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (1979.) In the Chavez 
c~se, the court determined that the statute requires the state to 
show that the defendant acted with criminal negligence rather than 
just simple negligence. 
The appellant contends that if he is guilty of a crime,. 
that crime should be automobile homicide. .The Chavez case is 
helpful to the present case in three respects: The facts, the 
holding and the dissenting opinion. 
The facts in Chavez are as follows: The defendant was 
travelling down State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, at a high 
., 
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rate of speed when he approached the intersection of ·3900 South 
facing a red light. It was 10:00 p.m., and the lanes of traffic 
w~re blocked by several cars waiting for the red light. The 
d~fendant veered out of the lanes of traffic, drove on the gutter 
around the other cars waiti~g for the light to change, and went 
into the intersection where he collided with a car travelling on 
3900 South, killing a two year old boy. 
' 
The facts in the Chavez case are more aggregious than the 
present case in many respects. Chavez was driving at a time when 
S~ate Street was congested with traffic. He not only ran a red 
l~ght, but actually had to veer off the road to get around vehicles 
w~iting for the red light, arid his blood alcohol registered!pt .19%. 
Yet, in this case, the Utah' Supreme Court wasn't grappling ~~th the 
' 
problem of murder or manslaughter. They were trying to det~Fmine 
if the deg~ee of culpability evidenced by Chavez was great erough 
to impose ah automobile homicide conviction. 
Chavez appealed his automobile homicide conviction on the 
basis that the court had instructed the jury that only simple 
negligence was required. Chavez claimed that a showing of criminal 
negligence was required. The Supreme Court of Utah agreed and 
remanded the case for retrial to determine if Chavez's actions 
constituted criminal negligence. The law stated in Chavez was 
later overruled by the legislature but at the time of appellant's 
accident, Chavez was the law in Utah. The court was clear in the 
Chavez case, holding that: 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that 
our previous cases holding that automobile 
homicide requires only proof of simple 
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negligence under Section 76-5-207, are in 
error and are overruled. And we hold that 
a conviction of automobile homicide requires 
an instruction on criminal negligence as 
that term is defined in Section 76-2-103(4). 
Id at 1228. 
Criminal negligence is defined in Section 76-2-103: 
A person engages in conduct: 
( 1) .. . 
( 2) .. . 
(3) .. . (4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he · 
ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustiaf iable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
This appears to be an accurate and appropriate description 
of appellant's conduct in the case now before the court. 
Finally, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Crockett 
recognizes an important principle. Crockett made it clear that 
he felt that Chavez's actions were exactly what was contemplated 
in the definition of automobile homicide and he affirms an important 
rule of law that should be considered in the present case. He 
states that: 
that: 
The universally accepted rule is that a specific 
statute takes precedence over a general one. 
Therefore, the definition of defendant's 
crime is found in the just quoted (automobile 
homicide) statute. Id at 1229. 
73 American Jurisprudence 2d, Statutes, Section 257, indicates 
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Where there is in the same statute a 
specific provision and also a general 
one which in its most comprehensive 
sense would include matters embraced iri 
the former, the:particular provision 
must control, and the general provision 
must be taken tb: affect only such cases 
within its general language as are not 
within the provisions of the particular 
provisions. 
In addition to Justic~-Crockett!~_ opinion in the Chavez 
case, the Utah Supreme Court in Millert v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
'": • •,. r~ •~• 
"'. : 
609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980); Bateman v. ·Board of Examiners, 322 P.2d 
., . 
. ,. 
381(Utah1958); Pacific Irttermountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 316 P.2d 549 (Utah 1957); State v. Burnham, 49 P.2d 
963 (Utah 1935); has held that the State of Utah adheres to this 
general principle. 
In the p~es~nt case, there is no question that the appellant 
;, '-:,, )'. -.- ~(( . 
·:, ~ : :·, r • 
was operating-:a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
~· ,i· 
. .. .... ~ \ 
intoxicating liquor and thereby caused another's death. 
. I 
'The Chavez case confirms that at the time of the appellant's 
' 
accident, a conviction of automobile homicide required a showing 
-
. --, 
of criminal negligence. Appellant denies that he was acting with 
any kind of malice, either _implied or actual. ·However, appellant 
concedes that his conduct was arguably criminally negligent as 
;. 
defined by th~t statute. 
~POINT III 
WHEN THE SAME CONDUCT IS PROSCRIBED BY 
TWO DIFFERENT CRIMINAL PENALTIES, THE 
ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF 
THE LESSER. 
In the Utah State Supreme Court case of State v. Shondel, 
453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), a case involving possession of LSD, this 
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court adhered to the general criminal principle that where the 
d~fendant's conduct is encompassed by two different criminal 
! I 
penalties, that the accused should be convicted of tpe lesser. 
I: 
This general rule is summarized in 50 ALR 1531, where it states 
that: 
The safest of all rules, in the construing 
of criminal statutes of doubtful meaning, 
is to resolve the ambiguity into the 
milder construction, in favor of the 
party accused. Id at 1533 and 1534. 
. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this rule in the 
,, . 
caRe of United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 
73 S. Ct. 227, . 97. L. Ed. 260 (1952.) 
In the initial preliminary hearing, Judge Taylor felt that 
the state had made out a case against the appellant for manslaughter. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that driving a vehicle 
while intoxicated constitutes an act of recklessness in the cases 
of State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977); State v. Anderson, 561 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977); and State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 
1977.) Also, under the manslaughter statute, this court has ruled 
in State v. Adamson, 125 P.2d 429 (Utah 1942); and State v. Olsen, 
160 P.2d 427 (Utah 1945), that a defendant must be shown to have 
acted with criminal negligence. Therefore, from the above cases 
and the ruling in Chavez, which requires criminal negligence for 
an automobile homicide conviction, we find that the culpability 
distinction between the two statutes is virtually obliterated. 
~ Therefore, the appellant contends that he is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser statute, that of automobile homicide. 
:t 
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CONCLUSION 
The state failed to show any form of malice on the part of 
appellant as required by Utah's second degree murder statute. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding 
~ 
that the appellant's conduct evidenced the depraved indifference 
. -
for human, life that is req~~red by-the statute. The cases cited 
by this court in the Nicholson case and subsequently cited by 
the trial court substantiate the appellant's claim. 
'!.~ 
A person who sets off a bomb in a crowded area or a person 
who drives his car at high speed into a parade, or the person who 
shoots a gun into a crowded theater, is clearly guilty of 2nd 
deg~ee murder. That is a far cry from'. the factual situation in 
the.present case. The appellant's conduct was inappropriate and 
foolhardy and resulted in a terrible tragedy. However, to construe 
the totality of the circumstances in this case to, in some way,, 
imply a· state of maliciousri~ss on the part of the appellant would 
i.'•r 
blur.the concept of malice to the point of making it meaningless. 
There is absolutely no reason for this court to do that. 
The legislature has enacted the statute of automobile homicide, 
~ 
which clearly and distinctly covers the factual situation presented 
by this case. This court has affirmed that it adheres to the 
general rule that when a specific statute proscribes a certain 
set ?f facts, the specific ·statute should be used as opposed to a 
general statute which may also, in a broader sense, cover the 
same circumstances. Further, this court has indicated that it 
follows the rule of statutory construction that entitles the 
accused to the benefit of the lesser of two statutes that describe 
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the same conduct. 
The appellant contends that the murder in the 2nd degr~e 
l 
conviction should be overturned and a conviction entered for 
automobile homicide. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ q- day of March, 1982. 
'. 
I 
'' 
I 
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